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Introduction 
 
Good management of irrigation schemes is becoming increasingly recognized as an 
essential means to achieve successful irrigated agriculture the world over. It is 
recognized that poor performance is not only a consequence of technical 
performance in the design and operation of irrigation systems - although it is 
sometimes an important factor (Samakande et al., 2004). Many of the problems are 
based on weaknesses in the organization and management of the scheme 
(Manzungu, 1999; Manzungu and van der Zaag, 1996; Senzanje et al., 2003). This 
paper seeks to examine and evaluate the socio-cultural, institutional and political 
aspects of water allocation and management in three small-scale irrigation schemes 
in the Mzingwane Catchment, Limpopo Basin, Zimbabwe.  
 
Study area 
 
This study focused on three irrigation schemes, Silalabuhwa, Makoshi and Siwazi but 
more in-depth study was done on Silalabuhwa. These irrigation schemes are all 
located in Insiza District in Mzingwane catchment (figure 1). A variety of crops are 
grown in the three schemes which include, maize, sugar beans, sweet potatoes, 
vegetables and winter wheat. 
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Figure 1. Location of study sites in the Mzingwane Catchment (after ZINWA, 2003). 
 
Silalabuhwa irrigation scheme is one of the oldest schemes in Mzingwane, having 
been opened in 1967 with initial size of 360 ha. However the scheme expanded with 
time and has grown to about 440 ha with 843 plot holders. The plot sizes range from 
0.1-1.0 ha. Water to the scheme is supplied from Silalabuhwa Dam, which has a 
capacity of 23.454 x106 m3, via gravity flow through a canal. There are five night 
storage dams in the scheme that were constructed in 1966 with varying sizes 
depending on the section they serve. Dams 3 and 4 are bigger compared to the other 
three.  
 
Figure 2. Silalabuhwa irrigation scheme. 
 
Siwazi was designed and constructed by the Zimbabwe government extension 
department (AGRITEX, now AREX) and was completed in 1992. The scheme size is 
20 ha with 50 plot holders each allocated 0.4 ha. It gets its water from Siwazi dam 
which has a net capacity of 2.235x106 m3. The water is gravity fed into asbestos pipe 
network to the scheme where it goes to the night storage dam. From the night 
storage dam it goes to the fields through concrete lined canals. A block system of 
irrigation is practiced where each farmer has a 0.133 ha in each of the three blocks. 
The method of water supply is flood irrigation.  
 
Figure 3. Siwazi irrigation scheme. 
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Makoshi irrigation scheme gets its water from Makoshi dam that was constructed in 
1997 and work started on the scheme in 1998. It is 10 ha in area, with 25 plot 
holders. Each plot holder has a 0.4 ha. The scheme gets its water from Makoshi dam 
which has a net capacity of 9.524x106 m3. The water is gravity fed through PVC 
piping to the scheme. The farmers use drip kits for irrigation. 
 
Methods 
 
The methods used include documentary review, case study approach and 
comparative analysis. The methods used to collect the necessary data are key-
informant interviews, semi-structured interviews, group discussions as well as 
administering a questionnaire to the farmers. Content analysis was used to analyse 
and quantify the results of the interviews. For quantitative data, excel was used to 
generate frequency tables. The sample plot holders were sampled from two 
sections/blocks of Silalabuhwa; Nonoka and Vuka as well Makoshi and Siwazi. 
Sample size of 120 was used, 100 in Silalabuhwa and 10 each in Makoshi and 
Siwazi. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Water Shortages 
Figure 4. Causes of water shortages 
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Figure 5. Response to water shortages 
 
 
Silalabuhwa: The greatest proportion (56%) of respondents attributed water 
shortages to drought year and unpaid water bills. 
 
Siwazi: Even though Siwazi also pays for water there is no history of any water cuts 
at the scheme because of the stringent regulations in place that ensure that everyone 
pays water bills on time. 
 
Makoshi: In Makoshi irrigation scheme, 90% of the respondents said they do 
experience water shortage as a result of blockage of pipes that causes low water 
pressure. 
 
Water Allocation 
 
The way water is allocated in Silalabuhwa is different compared to Makoshi and 
Siwazi. In Makoshi farmers are not involved in water allocation as the pipes are 
always laid down in the plots and it is the duty of the water distributor to open the 
gate valve at the dam and the valves at each plot. In Siwazi, the block system is used 
where by each farmer has a 0.133 ha in each block. Watering is by blocks and there 
is a water bailiff, a civil servant, who is responsible for allocating water to the blocks. 
Within the blocks, farmers give each other turns to irrigate. Whereas in Silalabuhwa 
and Siwazi farmers take as much water as they need for as long as they need it, in 
Makoshi a timed rotation is used. 
 
In all the three schemes there were claims of unfair water allocation. Some farmers 
said sometimes they have problems in getting water especially when it is planting 
time when everyone needs water as water will be allocated on a ‘you know who’ and 
‘who you are’ basis. They alluded this to favouritism, where the subcommittee looks 
at who you are in society as well as one’s political affiliation. They are only 
completely assured of water when it is harvesting time since competition for water 
then will be low. 
 
Table 1. Reasons attributed to unfair water allocation and suggestions given to 
improve allocation 
 
Reasons Suggestions 
• No respect and lack of consideration for 
others among irrigators (A farmer can take 
as much time as he wants irrigating when 
there are more farmers waiting for the 
same water) 
• There is favouritism whereby they 
(subcommittee) looks at someone social 
and political standing as well as relationship 
to the Chairmen or other committee 
members 
• Water is not released on stipulated time i.e. 
7a.m resulting in farmers not getting 
enough time to irrigate 
• The water is allocated as per requirement 
• Water distributors should be paid so that 
they do their work well,  
• Time given to each irrigator should not be 
violated 
• Subcommittee should be changed 
regularly so that the disadvantaged do not 
suffer at the expense of the same 
committee 
• Water should be supplied at the stipulated 
time, early in the morning so that people 
have enough time to irrigate their fields 
• Stringent measures should be put in place 
so that those who are not supposed to 
irrigate on that particular day do not do so. 
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in terms of how many farmers are irrigating 
on that day, but some farmers do not 
register for water but they go ahead and 
irrigate.  
 
• Should have a meter at every night 
storage dam so that farmers in that 
particular section are accountable for 
losses, this also encourages them to 
maintain their canals. Farmers should be 
charged for the water they are using, not 
for losses  
 
Farmers said they do not say anything in meetings and various reasons were given. 
Some of the critical, recurrent reasons given are; 
• I am a widow: [people say that] I can not say anything of value and no-one will 
take me seriously 
• I am shy because I am a woman, I can not speak in front of men 
• I am too old (86 years) and tired 
• The Chairman dictates and never listens to anyone 
 
Results indicated that there are more males than females in the committees be it the 
IMC (Irrigation Management Committee) or sub-committees, even though the 
females make up the largest number of the plot holders in the scheme. 
 
Table 2. Reasons cited for ineffectiveness of IMC and suggestions that increase 
effectiveness of IMC 
Reasons Suggestions 
• No coordination among committee 
members thus it is weak 
• No communication between farmers and 
committee 
• Dictatorship on part of the Chairman 
• Same Committee has been in control for a 
long period 
• No transparency 
• Misuse of water funds 
• They are more involved in politics that have 
nothing to do with the scheme operations 
• Favouritism 
• Sub committee members should attend IMC 
meetings, currently they are not allowed to 
attend 
• There should be a constitution which 
governs conduct of the IMC and penalty for 
those who do not adhere to rules 
• Current committee should be removed from 
office as it has run out of ideas to make way 
for a new one 
• Constitution should state the terms of office 
of the IMC 
• IMC should be changed regularly and there 
should be an independent body to assess its 
performance 
• IMC should be trained in management 
aspects 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The findings show that the institutional arrangement in the schemes determines the 
way water is allocated and they also affect water use and management. The results 
also show that the irrigators do not have the same access to water and do not speak 
with one voice as to how water should be managed as social status, gender, power, 
institutional dynamics and group interests appear to determine one’s accessibility to 
water and its management. These findings suggest that for smallholder irrigation to 
achieve equity and efficiency in water allocation and management there should be 
integration of the technical, institutional dynamics, social and political factors from 
planning to implementation of projects.  
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Recommendations 
 
• Formulation of policy guidelines specific for each type of scheme to conform to 
the management in a given scheme depending on prevailing conditions and 
size of the scheme. 
• The responsible authorities should take into account how they can exclude 
non-paying farmers when designing irrigation schemes. 
• Big schemes (100ha or more) should be operated as subsidiary units to 
improve management. 
• Strengthening irrigation scheme institutions such as the IMC, Section 
subcommittees, farmers and AREX supervisor and extension staff so that 
there is coordination that can improve overall management. 
• User based allocation should be used in these schemes. 
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